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In spring of 2008, at the NSAA National Convention in San Francisco, California, an objective 
was established by the B77 committee to develop a modern risk assessment process that would 
be conducive to the needs and culture of the passenger ropeway transportation industry.  The 
objective for this risk assessment process is to provide a structured methodology for 
manufacturers, engineers, and operators to effectively estimate and evaluate risks associated with 
passenger ropeway utilization, such that consistent risk mitigation processes and modern 
functional safety systems could be effectively employed.  An Ad Hoc committee was assembled 
to commence development on this process.   
 
After one year of development activity, respectable progress towards this objective has been 
made, and a draft version of this process will soon be submitted to the full ANSI B77 committee 
for draft ballot.   This paper will provide a basis for the concepts that have been employed in the 
process thus far, including the challenges that have surfaced as well as the challenges that lie 
ahead.  In addition, the concept of modern functional safety system design will be discussed in 
order to support the alignment of this risk assessment process with modern functional safety 
design standards. 
 
The preliminary risk assessment document, Draft Annex-J, is attached as part of this document to 
support the topic of the paper. 
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Since its inception, the ANSI B77 standard has continued to evolve as a performance-based, 
prescriptive standard providing a solid foundation for the design and operation of passenger 
ropeway transportation.  Over the past decade, however, the standard has struggled to remain in 
unison with modern technology development by not appropriately adapting or evolving methods 
which specify its application in safety-related systems.     
 
A major factor in this struggle has been the lack of a prescribed or referenced method in the 
standard for assessing risk associated with identified hazards.  Without some measure of risk, 
there is little justification for prescribing relevant or appropriate specifications for risk mitigation 
measures.   
 
An instance of this limitation is the prescription within the B77 standard
2
 for monitoring the 
acceleration (+/-) component of an operable ropeway.  The difficulty with classifying this 
function lie in the fact that both the hazard severity, and the probability of the hazardous event 
could vary dramatically depending on various aspects of the ropeway configuration such as size, 
profile, primary mover type, etc.  Theoretical assessment of this hazard results in a range of risk 
exposures from low to high.  Unfortunately, as this function was diligently assessed through 
many subcommittee meetings, there was no other option then to take the more conservative 
approach and classify the circuit as a protection circuit
3
.  This requires that all installations 
covered in B77.1 (sections 2, 3, and 4)
2
 to have a safety system installed for monitoring this 
condition that meets the requirements of a Protection Circuit
3
.  This results in added costs and 
complexity that may arguably be considered over-specified for installations that may present 
negligible to low levels of risk related to this hazard.   
 
This topic also led to the discussion of other prescribed safety functions within the B77 standard 
that could be debated for similar reasons.  As B77 committee members, we often find ourselves 
with the responsibility of using knowledge, expertise, experience, and ethics in classifying 
safeguarding measures that we prescribe.  We are usually compelled to classify risks in the most 
conservative direction through purely social considerations alone.  In some instances, however, 
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 Acceleration/deceleration monitoring.  ANSI B77.1-2006, clause(s) 2.2.3.8, 3.2.3.8, 4.2.3.8  
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there may be times that identified hazards are dismissed altogether due to the lack of an 
appropriate classification for low probability risks.  Risk assessment and proper functional safety 
specification will provide the passenger ropeway industry a process for making consistent, 
diligent, and ethical determinations to address these types of circumstances. 
 
 
2. Defining a basis 
 
The first two-day working session for the Risk Assessment AdHoc committee was conducted in 
August, 2008 in Denver, Colorado.   These two days involved getting all team members on the 
same wavelength, at least with respect to our objectives.  This involved team members 
discussing or presenting on aspects of risk assessment through different viewpoints.  A 
discussion was also shared regarding the overall safety-related system design process.  Concepts 
presented in the Automated People Mover standard
4
, and other models were reviewed.  There 
was agreement that although risk assessment is probably the most critical element for 
establishing the framework for a safety program, it is definitely not the only element for assuring 
its success.  With that said, it is recognized that the potential exists for the incorporation and 
requirement for a more detailed and complete safety program including additional activities such 
as planning, management, specification, validation, and maintenance such as that outlined in the 
APM standard
4
.  It was agreed, however, that this exceeded the scope of intent for the Risk 
Assessment AdHoc committee, at least for now, and that efforts and resources must be focused 
on the current task of developing only the risk assessment phase at this time.   
 
 
3. Target objectives for the risk assessment methodology 
 
1) To provide a risk assessment process that will:  
 
o Document identified hazard exposure to personnel, passengers, and others that 
may be affected.   
o Provide a technique for estimating risk which is dependent on a straightforward 
selection of identifiable risk parameters.   
o Based on estimated risk, specify an appropriate measure and its required 
performance based on a hierarchy of risk reduction measures. 
o In the case where a risk reduction measure is to be implemented as a safety-
related control function, a table shall be provided to allow the correlation of 
required performance or integrity levels established in international mainstream 
functional safety standards.  This will provide the necessary guidance for the 
design and development of safety related control systems that will take advantage 
of appropriate state-of-the-art techniques, products, and solutions. This will also 
eliminate the need for prescriptive functional safety design requirements to be 
maintained within the B77 standard. 
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2) The process shall incorporate an integration of concepts and methodology implemented 
across other comparable and relevant industry sector standards.  This will help insure that 
the established framework is justified and substantiated by comparable sectors with 
respect to risk assessment and functional safety system design. 
 
3) The process shall be formulated around parameters, conditions, and events unique to the 
passenger ropeway industry. 
 
4) The process shall as best possible achieve some level of congruence with EN passenger 






It was agreed that the overwhelming scope and implication of risk assessment would eventually 
affect the entire standard.  It was unclear, however, how the process would be accepted by the 
full committee, or the degree of modification that may be required on a continual basis to shape 
the process into an efficient and usable format.  Most importantly, it was agreed that a risk 
assessment process could potentially have an immediate, positive impact on current standards 
development activities and that the benefits of this process could feasibly solve many problems 
that were currently in debate.  
 
With these issues in mind, a decision was made to approach the project in a phased 
implementation, with the first phase consisting of an Annex
5
 that could be voted on and easily 
implemented as a corrigendum to the base standard.  The long term approach would begin 
targeting areas throughout the standard requiring implicit references as needed where the 
application of the risk assessment process would be recommended or prescribed.  These 
modifications would be phased into the next major revision of the standard.   
 
This phased approach would allow us in the short term to provide continued maintenance, 
development, and modification to the annex without causing serious formatting issues with the 
base standard.  The intent will be for the annex to take a normative stance, however, the logistics 
of when and how the process will take precedence over current prescriptive safeguarding 
applications has yet to be determined. 
 
 
5. Research and application 
 
Although many team members brought various expertises, knowledge, and experience that 
would be critical to development, the foundation of this development is based solidly on 
mainstream industry standards and state-of-the-art practices. Several risk assessment and 
functional safety standards were selected for review and adaptation.  They are modern, 
mainstream consensus standards that are accepted and utilized globally in applications of similar 
relevance and with comparable risk factors.  They are all focused on the concept of risk 
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assessment. These standards, which are listed below, were reviewed and analyzed with respect to 
concept, structure, philosophy, applicability, and usability: 
 
• ISO 14121-1:2007  
Safety of machinery / Risk Assessment  
• ANSI/RIA R15.06:1999 / Clause 9, Risk Assessment 
Safety requirements for industrial robots and robot systems  
• ISO 13849-1:2006  
Safety of machinery / Safety related parts of control systems  
• IEC 62061:2005 –  
Safety of machinery / Functional safety of safety-related 
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic control systems.  
• ANSI/ASCE/T&DI 21-05  
Automated People Mover Standards – Part 1  
• EN 13243:2004 / Annex’s A, B, and C  
Safety Requirements for cableway installations designed to carry persons  
• ANSI/PMMI B155.1-2006 
Safety requirements for packaging and packaging-related converting machinery 
 
 
During this research, we have focused on particular aspects of different methodologies and 
proceeded to apply concepts from these standards that helped meet the overall objectives of the 
methodology.  Processes which provided an abbreviated approach (10 – 20 pages) offered an 
aspect of user-friendliness that should prove beneficial over the short term.  Our approach would 
shoot for similar length and content.  Processes that were too abbreviated (1-2 pages) would 
prove to be too vague and not provide enough guidance or example that would be necessary for 
this industry.  Also considered was whether or not to simply reference an external risk 
assessment standard.  Through review and discussion, it was obvious that relevant risk 
assessment methodologies that currently existed were highly focused on general machinery 
application and some correlation would have to be made with respect to terminology.  
Experience within the group also identified that this would make the process too complex, or 
highly unusable for the majority of those required to implement it.  So the decision to develop a 
custom methodology fitting more closely the requirements of the passenger ropeway industry 
was made.  It is possible that informative references could be added to the annex referencing 
additional risk assessment standards to provide further reference and resources for those looking 
for further qualitative guidance. This will be considered as development continues.   
 
The primary framework and body of the Annex-J
5
 process has been derived from parts of 
ANSI/RIA R15.06, Safety requirements for robots and robot systems.  This standard offers a 
very straightforward approach to risk assessment that included requirements and responsibilities 
for both the manufacturer of the equipment as well as the end user.  Structure and terminology 
was modified and various concepts have been expanded in order to provide applicability. The 
R15.06 process follows a standard iterative risk assessment process and is closely coupled to a 
widely understood hierarchy of risk mitigation techniques.  This allowed us to create a 
“hierarchy of risk mitigation measures” that would provide guidance on the appropriate 
application of mitigation techniques other than safety-related controls, such as awareness 
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indicators, signs, procedures, training, personal protective equipment, information for use, and 
others. 
 
Several standards were assessed that offered different graph and matrix-based processes for 
estimating risk.  Since passenger ropeway related hazards would encompass a wide range of 
event conditions for both personnel and passenger related interaction, we looked for a process 
which entailed more than two discrete choices for each individual risk parameter such as 
severity, frequency of occurrence, avoidance, and so forth.  Having more possibilities to select 
from allows for a more accurate estimation and also eliminates more instances of having to make 
“fuzzy” decisions due to selections that may fall somewhere between two selections.  Also 
considered was the number and relevance of possible risk categories that could be derived 
through the estimation and how these risk categories would align with various other functional 
safety standards as well as the European passenger ropeway standards.   
 
The risk parameter selection and estimation method is highly based on the methodology outlined 
in IEC 62061:2005/Annex A.  Terminology and nomenclature has been modified for 
applicability and various elements were modified in certain instances in an attempt to simplify 
parameter selection.  The basic structure was maintained such that ultimate determination of risk 
reduction levels (RRLs) would directly coincide with established SIL (Safety Integrity Level) 
terminology utilized in the IEC 62061:2005 standard.  In turn, SILs can be correlated to PLs 
(Performance Levels) via ISO 13849-1:2006 / Table 4, and likewise to AK (Requirements Class) 
via the table in EN 13243:2004 / Annex B.  The correlation of RRLs to either SIL or PL has also 
been provided in Draft Annex-J
5




The main challenges of developing this process have primarily revolved around taking such a 
broad and complex subject and developing an abstract process that was simple to use and 
directly applicable to the industry.  If it is difficult to apply, or its benefits are not well 
understood, then it will experience resistance.  The process simply needs to be distributed as its 
real usefulness cannot be understood, assessed, or improved until it has been practiced by the 
very people that will be required to apply and/or verify it.    As with most standards or new 
concepts, it will not be perfect at inception, and for that matter, may never be perfect.  Our 
challenge moving forward with this will not be known until the first wave of feedback is 
provided by the committee. 
 
A further challenge that exists, and is experienced with most risk assessment processes in 
practice, is in the determination of acceptable risk.  At what point in the process, for a 
particular hazard, have the applied risk mitigation technique(s) lowered the risk to some 
acceptable level?  This concept is addressed in part when the risk mitigation is to be provided 
through a safety-related control function (functional safety).  In this case, a safety function 
(safety circuit) is designed which will detect the hazardous conditions and control potential 
hazardous energy sources effectively eliminating the hazardous event.  The safety function, 
however, shall be designed in accordance with either IEC 62061:2005 or ISO 13849-1:2006 to 
the selected SIL or PL, which includes suitable requirements for fault tolerance (redundancy), 
fault diagnostics, common cause failures, and very importantly failure rate probability.  Also 
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covered are stringent coding standards and validation of safety rated application software.   
Meeting the sum of these requirements per the standard verifies that the function will achieve a 
target PFHd (probability of dangerous failure per hour) value, and in turn providing a quantitative 
level of risk reduction.  An additional justification to SILs and PLs here is with the APM 
standard
4
, where acceptable risk is ultimately parameterized by quantitative measure in MTBHE 
(mean time between hazardous events).  In comparison, a catastrophic or critical hazard may be 
deemed acceptable per the APM standard
4
 (with notification to the AHJ) if the applied safety 
system can assure a MTBHE of at least 100 million hours (1 x 10
8
 hours).  This is the highest 
MTBHE specified and classifies the possibility of the hazardous event occurring as 
“improbable”. Conversely, SIL 3 and PLe safety functions are in the order of 1 X 10
8
 hours 
between dangerous failures (hazardous events).  
 
For the cases in which complementary measures other than safety-related control functions have 
been applied, such as fixed guarding, signs, warning indicators, procedures, etc., or the 
functional safety system will not completely control the hazard, then one must evaluate any 
residual risk.  This is accomplished by re-applying the risk estimation process, modifying any 
risk parameters that were effectively reduced, and re-calculating residual risk.  In this case, there 
is no fine line drawn in the sand.  Logic might establish that an RRL=Low would be the target, 
but only under circumstances in which at least one iterative step of reduction has been applied.  
 
In comparison to some of the other standards reviewed, the ANSI R15.06 standard requires, after 
estimation, at least one application of risk mitigation for any hazard identified, regardless of risk 
category.  However, once one pass has been made, if the risk level falls into categories with 
minor severity (first aid or less) harm, then acceptable risk is assumed.  
 
Furthermore, in the packaging standard, ANSI B155.1-2006, a definition is provided for 
acceptable risk and is given (in part) as the following: The expression “acceptable risk” refers to 
the level at which further risk reduction will not result in significant  reduction in risk; or 
additional expenditure will not result in significant advantages of increased safety.  Also 
mentioned as a note in this definition is; the user and supplier may have different levels of 
acceptable risk.  Although this entire definition could be highly construed and leaves a high 
degree of gray area, it at least provides a basis for ones thinking as they work through the 
process. 
 
Tolerable (acceptable) risk is a topic covering a very large scope of probabilistic thinking, a wide 
range of theory and philosophy, and involves a highly complex mathematical basis.  The beauty 
of applying IEC 62061:2005 or ISO 13849-1:2006 is that tolerable risk is not only taken care of 
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7. Moving forward 
 
An objective that will hopefully be met and incorporated prior to a final vote on the draft would 
be an additional table or section providing numerous worked examples of applying this process.  
This has been similarly provided in EN 13243:2004 / Annex C, and seems to serve as a very 
valuable guide.   
 
Long term research and review will begin regarding the incorporation of advanced topics on 
tolerable risk, such as ALARP (as low as reasonably possible) as well as further risk reduction 
measures to include advanced topics in LOPA (layer of protection analysis) as they are deemed 
applicable.  These are topics that be reference in IEC 61508-5:1998, IEC 61511-3:2004, and 
through various other industry standards and resources.   
 
8. Acknowledgements and conclusion.   
 
As chairman of the ANSI B77 AdHoc committee on Risk Assessment, I would like to thank the 
team members that have invested thoughtlessly and constructively their time, support, patience, 
resources and feedback over the past year in this development work.  It has not been easy, and I 
have a feeling that we are not quite over the hump yet.  This is a great document that everyone 
should be proud of.  I would also like to thank Sid Roslund and Jon Mauch who seen the vision 
early, as did we, and provided the kick start necessary by nominating an AdHoc committee.  We 
won’t let you down. 
 
In summary, the Risk Assessment AdHoc committee members are always available for 
discussion and openly welcome all constructive participation that can be offered. 
 







J. Safeguarding of passengers and personnel – risk assessment methodology 
 
For new installations or relocations, a risk assessment shall be performed. The risk assessment 
shall take into account the stage of development, intended use of the Passenger Ropeway, 
anticipated skill and training of personnel, additional risk exposure and reasonably foreseeable 
events or misuse.  A number of methodologies are available to do a risk assessment. Any 
method is acceptable which prescribes safeguarding equivalent to or more stringent than the 
requirements of this annex. The risk assessment process shall be instituted during the system 
planning/design phase and continue throughout the system construction, operation, and 
decommissioning.  The risk assessment process shall emphasize the prevention of accidents by 
resolving hazards in a systematic manner as described below. 
 
The hazard resolution process shall be initiated by defining the physical and functional 
characteristics of the Passenger Ropeway system to be analyzed.  These characteristics shall be 
presented in terms of the people, procedures, facilities and equipment which are integrated to 
perform a specific operational task or function within a specific environment. 
 
The hazards shall be identified.  The techniques and methods used to identify the hazards shall 
include: 
 
(1) Data from previous accidents or operating experience 
 
(2) Expert opinion and hazard scenarios 
 
(3) Checklists of potential hazards 
 
(4) Previous hazard analyses 
 
(5) Other analysis techniques as appropriate 
 
All identified hazards shall be assessed in terms of the severity or consequence of the hazard 
and the probability of occurrence.  This shall be accomplished in general accordance with the 
criteria outlined herein or equivalent. 
  
Risk assessment estimates shall be used as the basis in the decision-making process to 
determine whether individual system or subsystem hazards shall be eliminated, mitigated, or 
accepted.  Hazards shall be resolved through a design process that emphasizes the elimination 
of the hazard.  For structures and foundations as defined in section x.1.1.6, an acceptable level of 
risk will be considered as being achieved if such structures and foundations are designed in 
accordance with section 1.3. For all other hazard resolution strategies, or safeguards, the 
following hierarchy of controls shall be employed, in order of effectiveness (most to least);   
 
(1) Design by hazard elimination or substitution 
 
(2) Engineered Safeguards 
 
(3) Awareness means 
 
(4) Administrative controls (Training and Procedures) 
 
(5) Personal Protective Equipment 
 
(6)        Acceptance of the residual risk / Information for use concerning the residual risk 
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This process shall include full documentation of the hazard resolution activities.  The 
effectiveness of the safeguards shall be monitored to determine that no new hazards are 
introduced.  In addition, whenever substantive changes are made to the system, analyses shall 
be conducted to identify and resolve any new hazards introduced. 
 
Where risk mitigation techniques and safeguarding methods are previously prescribed by various 
sections in this standard, the risk assessment shall serve as a method for determining suitable 
application according to the “hierarchy of controls” as well as functional safety circuit performance 
requirements as applicable.  This method may be utilized to assess the applicability of a 
safeguard according to variable conditions or characteristics for a particular application. 
 
This methodology is not meant to serve as a structural or component Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), nor as a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for assessing the probability of structural or 
component failures within the passenger ropeway installation.  FMEA and FTA are good methods 
for determining failure induced hazards, specifically in complex systems, and are very important 
to any complete hazard analysis.  Failure modes identified through these processes shall be 
inherently designed out of the system utilizing prescriptive methods defined in this standard, 
through proven engineering methods, and through defining proper maintenance and testing 
cycles for components through the expected life of the equipment.  In cases where an FMEA, 
FTA, or similar analysis predicts that a particular critical component failure is probable or 
imminent (inside of the expected lifespan of the equipment due to foreseeable neglect, 
inadequate maintenance cycles, or deficiencies in expected product quality or grade), then the 




a) The risk assessment shall be performed by the Designer or Manufacturer at the time of 
initial Passenger Ropeway design to determine minimum safeguarding requirements and 
to develop an overall safety strategy. This assessment shall be revised and updated as 
the design process matures prior to installation of the Passenger Ropeway.  
 
b) Additional risk assessments shall be performed by the manufacturer and the owner 
upon final installation and configuration, and again by the owner each time the 
operational configuration changes (I.e., maze and passenger loading configuration, ramp 
configuration, etc.) or a modification is made to the Passenger Ropeway. The owner shall 
maintain the documentation of the most recent risk assessment(s).   
 
c) The first step of a risk assessment shall assume no safeguards are installed and 
include: 
 
o Determine the Limits of the Ropeway Installation per J.2.1 
o task and hazard identification per J.2.2 
o risk estimation per J.3 
 
d) The next step of a risk assessment shall evaluate the level of risk and select suitable 
mitigation techniques based on the requirements established in table J.4 and table J.5  
 
e) The final step of the risk assessment is to validate the safeguard selection by estimating 
residual risks as necessary, with the safeguards installed, per J.6  
 
f) All processes above shall be clearly and completely documented. 
 




NOTE – This annex provides a composite risk assessment methodology based on similar 
methodologies utilized in other relevant safety-related standards.   
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Figure 1 – Risk Assessment Flow Chart (General) 
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J.2 Determine the LIMITS of the ropeway and identify Hazards 
 
J.2.1 Determine the Limits of the ropeway operation 
 
Describe the application/process and a definition of the limits associated with its intended use; 
the risk assessment shall include a documented list of detailed specifications and operational 
parameters.  It shall also include an elevation profile and plan view diagram showing the intended 
installation and operational configuration for all terminals, operator houses, operator stations, and 
line equipment.  These elements will be used, in part, to set the basis for operational conditions 
that may be assumed for hazard identification and assessment.  Note: Diagrams shall indicate 
the region of space describing the immediate interface to the passenger ropeway for which the 
scope of risk assessment shall be contained or defined. 
 
 
J.2.2 Task and hazard identification 
 
a) Hazard identification shall include at least the following three distinct categories:  
 
a. Passenger related use, foreseeable hazardous events and misuse. 
b. Operations related tasks, foreseeable hazardous events, and misuse. 
c. Maintenance related tasks, foreseeable hazardous events, and misuse. 
 
b) Identify hazards associated with each task step, event, or instance of use for each of the 
categories list in (b) above, including those from reasonable foreseeable misuse.  List 
them in the Hazard Description column in Table J.5. 
 
a. The hazard shall be qualified with respect to parts of body exposed to harm and 
the actual hazardous energy causing the harm. 
b. Hazardous energy sources shall be identified in this block for the purposes of 
specifying the proper energy control safeguard. [See brackets in example below]. 
 




I.D. Event or Task 
Description of Related Hazard 
1 
Passenger falls in 
load zone in front 
of following 
carrier 
Concussions, fractures due to impact of following carrier, 
passenger legs, or skies into passenger while in pit area.   
[Momentum of following carrier / Main drive motor] 
2 
Passenger        
In-transit 
Limb fractures, concussions, death due to passenger 
leaning too far forward and falling out of open carrier. 
[Weight of Passenger, Gravity, distance of fall] 
3 
Passenger        
In-transit 
Limb fractures, concussions, or death to passengers due to 
carrier Impact with stalled carrier in decelerator section at 5 
m/s. [Main drive motor] 
4 
Passenger        
In-transit 
Limb fractures, concussions, or death due to passengers 
being ejected from carrier caused by deropement. [Weight 
of carrier w/passengers, Gravity, Main drive motor] 
 
(2) Operations task related: 
 
Hazard 
I.D. Event or Task 
Description of Related Hazard 
1 
Operator runs to 
pit area to assist 
improperly loaded 
passenger 
Concussions, fractures due to impact of following carrier into 
operator.  
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J.3 Risk estimation 
 
Risk estimation should be carried out for each hazard by determining the risk parameters in 
Figure 2.  This is accomplished by combining the severity of harm (S) with the probability of 
occurrence of that harm, which is the combination of: 
 
• the frequency and duration of the exposure of persons to the hazard (FD) 
• the probability of hazardous event resulting from of the exposure (PE) and; 




















             
                                                                                                Probability of occurrence of harm 
 















Figure 2 – Factors for Risk Estimation 
 
The estimates of these parameters are entered into a form similar to Table J.3, and should 
normally be based on worst-case considerations for the hazard in order to provide the most 
conservative approach to the safeguard. Whenever in doubt, always choose the more 
conservative selection.  However, in a situation where, for example, an irreversible injury is 
possible but at a significantly lower probability than a reversible one, then each severity level 
should have a separate line on the table. It may be the case that a different safeguard is 
implemented for each line. If one safeguard is implemented to cover both lines, then the highest 
Risk Reduction Level should be used. 
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J.3.1 –  Potential of hazard severity (S) 
 
Risk estimation step 1: Select the hazard severity parameter based on worst-case potential 
hazard related to the event or task and enter this value into table J.3 
 
Table J.3.1 – Severity of hazard (S) selection 
 
Consequence Severity 
Major irreversible injury such as losing an eye or limb, and including 
death. 4
Irreversible injury such as a major broken limb(s) or losing finger(s) 3
Serious reversible injury requiring attention from a medical practitioner 2
Reversible injury requiring general first aid 1
 







J.3.2 – Frequency and duration of exposure to hazard (FD) 
 
Risk estimation step 2: Select the frequency and duration of exposure to the hazard related to the 
event or task and enter the parameter in table J.3.  For hazards in which exposure rate may be 
difficult to correlate, the frequency of exposure could be substituted with the frequency of demand 
on a safety function used to detect the exposure under worst case operating conditions.  If in 
doubt between two selections, always choose the more conservative higher value.      
 
Table J.3.2 – Frequency and duration of exposure to hazard (FD) selection 
 
Hazard exposure occurs at a rate of:  
Duration of each 
exposure is more 
than 10 minutes 
Duration of each 
exposure is less 
than 10 minutes*1
Once per hour or more 5 5
Less than once per hour and up to once per day 
5 4
Less than once per day and up to once every 
two weeks 4 3
Less than once every two weeks and up to once 
per year 3 2
Less than once per year 
2 1
*1: For duration time, do not use the reduced value in the right column for hazard exposures when the exposure will 
always result in a hazardous event.  I.e., Tower Deropement 
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J.3.3 – Probability of hazardous event (PE) 
 
Risk estimation step 3: Select the probability of hazardous event related to the hazard exposure 
and enter the parameter into table J.3.   
 
Table J.3.3 – Probability of hazardous event (PE) selection 
 
Likelihood that the exposure will result in a 
hazardous event Probability of Hazardous Event (PE) 
Very high (>80% of exposures may lead to harm) 5 
Likely (61-80% of exposures may lead to harm) 4 
Possible (41-60% of exposures may lead to harm) 3 
Rarely (21-40% of exposures may lead to harm) 2 
Negligible (<21% of exposures may lead to harm) 1 
 













J.3.4 – Probability of avoiding or limiting the severity of harm (AL) 
 
Risk estimation step 4: Select the probability of avoiding or limiting severity of harm and enter the 
parameter into table J.3.   
 
Table J.3.4 – Probability of avoiding or limiting the severity of harm (AL) 
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J.4 Risk Evaluation  
 
Severity of the hazard (S) and probability of harm (PH) values recorded and calculated in Table 
J.5 are applied to the risk reduction decision matrix in table J.4 to determine the risk reduction 
level (RRL) for the associated hazard.   
 
Table J.4 – Risk reduction decision matrix  
 
Probability of harm (PH) = FD + PE + AL 
Severity 
(3-4) (5-7) (8-10) (11-13) (14-15) 
4 RR2 RR2 RR2 RR3 RR3 
3 Low  RR0 RR1 RR2 RR3 
2 Low  Low  RR0 RR1 RR2 
1 Low  Low Low RR0 RR1 
 
 















J.5 – Safeguard Selection 
 
With the Risk Reduction Level (RRL) now determined, utilize Table J.5 to determine the 
appropriate risk reduction technique or engineered safeguard.  Note: An attempt should always 
be made to eliminate the hazard through redesign or substitution, regardless of the RRL.  If the 
level of risk is at RRL=Low to begin with, at least some type of mitigation, even if minor, should 
be made if possible.  At least one complete pass of risk mitigation should be made for each 
identified hazard.  See table J.5.3 for an example showing all columns completed. 
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Hierarchy Of Risk 
Reduction Measure 
(Effectiveness Most To 
Least) 
RR3 
Rigorous attempt required:  
[Elimination] Risk reduction shall be accomplished 
by hazard elimination or hazard substitution which 
does not create an equal or greater hazard. Where 
hazard elimination or substitution is not possible; 
 
Required alternative: 
[Engineered Safeguards] preventing access to the 
hazard or causing the hazard to cease. Functional 
safety circuits, if applied, shall meet the 




[Elimination].  Where hazard elimination or 
substitution is not possible or impracticable; 
 
Required: 
[Engineered Safeguards] preventing access to the 
hazard or causing the hazard to cease. Functional 
safety circuits, if applied, shall meet the 




[Elimination].  Where hazard elimination or 
substitution is not possible or impracticable; 
 
Required: 
[Engineered Safeguards] preventing access to the 
hazard or causing the hazard to cease. Functional 
safety circuits, if applied, shall meet the 




[Elimination].  Where hazard elimination or 
substitution is not possible or impracticable; 
 
Required: 






Functional safety circuits, if applied, shall meet the 











   Elimination or  
   substitution: 
 
• Eliminate human 
interaction with hazard 
• Automate hazardous 
process to substitute 
lower risk for higher 
risk. 
• Increase clearances 
 
   Engineered  
   Safeguards: 
 
• Fixed barriers 
• Interlocked barriers. 
• Mechanical hard stops. 
• Anti-collision function. 
• Rope position 
detection function. 
• Over-speed detection 
function. 
• Calculated safety 
distances shall be 




   Awareness  
   Means: 
 
• Start alarms. 
• Operator interface 
warnings. 
• Signs. 






   Administrative 
   Controls: 
 
• Job safety procedures. 




• Information for Use 
 
   PPE / Personal   
   Protective  
   Equipment: 
 
• Safety glasses. 
• Ear plugs. 
• Face shields. 
• Gloves. 
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Level (SIL) - 
IEC 62061 
Performance 
Level (PL) - 
ISO 13849-1 
Average probability 
of dangerous failure 
per hour [1/h] 
 
Reserved for future 
information 
RR3 3 PLe ≥ 10-8 to < 10-7  
RR2 2 PLd ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6  
RR1 1 PLc ≥ 10-6 to < 3 X 10-6  
RR0 1 PLb ≥ 3 X 10-6 to < 10-5  
Low N/A PLa ≥ 10-5 to < 10-4  
Correlation between Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and Performance Level (PL) per ISO 13849-1:2006 Table 4. 
 
 
This area reserved for supplementary recommendations and/or guidance. 
/ 
/ - qualitative descriptions of relevant SILs and PLs with respect to structure (designated 
architecture), fault tolerance, diagnostic coverage, common cause failure, etc. to provide a 
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Mitigation technique or 
safeguard               
(J.5) 
1 




death to passengers 
due to carrier Impact 
with stalled carrier in 
decelerator section 
at 5 m/s.                  
[Main drive motor] 
4 4 5 5 14 RR3 
  
 
[Engineered Safeguard]  
 
Anti-collision monitoring 
system / safety-related 
control function  
(SIL 3 or PLe per J.6) 
2   
 





Note: The description under (Recommended risk mitigation technique or safeguard) is meant to serve as a safety function definition and not necessarily a 
safety requirements specification (SRS).    
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J.6 – Evaluating residual risk  
 
Once a risk mitigation technique or engineered safeguard are applied, it is necessary to assess 
the residual risk that may remain.   
 
When a safety-related control function has been defined, and designed such that it’s correct 
functioning eliminate exposure to the hazard, and the safety function has been designed to a 
correlating SIL or PL (table J.5.2), then the risk may be considered to be effectively reduced to a 
tolerable level. 
 
If the mitigation technique is other than an engineered safeguard, or, if the engineered safeguard 
does not effectively control all factors of the hazard, then it will be necessary to assess residual 
risk that may be remaining.    
 
J.6.1 Assessing residual risk 
 
The first step in calculating residual risk is to generate a further set of columns for S, FD, PE, AL, 
and a new result for PH and RRL.  The risk parameters should now be re-assessed with the 
mitigation technique employed.  This technique should have some effect on S, FD, PE, or AL in 
some combination such that the overall risk reduction level (RRL) will have been decreased. 
 
This new value for RRL is the residual risk that remains.  This residual risk should be re-
evaluated and further mitigation techniques employed until the risk is considered acceptable. 
 
Acceptable risk shall be a risk level at which further risk reduction will not result in significant 
reduction in risk; or additional expenditure will not result in significant advantages of increased 
safety.  Collaboration should be shared between the ropeway system manufacturer, or entity 
conducting the risk assessment and the owner, as these entities may have different levels of 
acceptable risk. 
 
When the hazard mitigation is complete, the conditions shall be re-assessed qualitatively to 
ensure that no new hazards have been created. 
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J. Definitions   ……..Section still in Progress 
 
Failure:  termination of the ability to perform an intended function. 
 
Hazard:  A potential source of harm 
 
PPE:  Personal protective equipment (I.e. safety glasses, safety shoes, hearing protection) 
 
Protective Measure: Measure intended to achieve risk reduction. (I.e. inherently safe design, 
safeguarding, complementary measures, PPE, safe working procedures, training, supervision, 
information for use) 
 
Risk(1):  combination of the severity of harm and the probability of occurrence of that harm 
 
Risk (2): A measure of the severity and likelihood of an accident. 
 
Risk Analysis: combination of the specification of the limits of machine, hazard identification and 
risk estimation 
 
Risk Assessment:  overall documented process comprising a risk analysis, application of 
protective measures, and risk evaluation 
 
Risk Evaluation:  judgment, on the basis of risk analysis, of whether the risk reduction objectives 
have been achieved 
 
Residual Risk: The element of risk remaining relative to a hazard after a risk reduction technique 
or safeguard has been applied. 
 
Interlock:  An arrangement of control elements so interconnected that their operations must 
succeed each other in proper sequence. 
 
Safeguard: A barrier guard, device, or safety-related control function designed for the protection 
of personnel or passengers. 
 
Safe State:  System state that is deemed acceptable by the hazard resolution process. 
 
Safety:  Freedom from unacceptable risk. 
 
Subsystem:  A major functional subassembly or grouping of items or equipment that is essential 
to operational completeness of a system. 
 
System:  A composite of people, procedures, facilities, and/or equipment that are integrated to 
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